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Abstract 
This paper seeks to explain why the European Union (EU) has had limited influence in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). Combining approaches from external governance, norm diffusion and 
structural foreign policy, it offers an explanation based on domestic factors in the 
two countries: the political regime, state capacity, political structures, domestic 
incentives and the perceived legitimacy of EU rules. Although willingness to reform 
appears to exist in Armenia, such willingness remains constrained by the country’s 
vulnerable geopolitical location and high dependence on Russia. By contrast, none 
of the domestic preconditions for EU influence identified by the analytical framework 
were found in Azerbaijan. The author argues that the Eastern Partnership has not 
properly addressed the extent to which the clan structures feed into informal political 
practices and enforce the sustainability of an existing regime in both countries, and 
that, in addition, the EU has underestimated the multipolar environment which the 
two countries have to operate in, making it unlikely that the current policy can reach 
its objectives in Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
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Introduction: Domestic Constraints on External Influence 
Armenia and Azerbaijan are engaged in a political dialogue with the European 
Union (EU) since the mid-1990s, throughout the course of which the EU has been 
promoting democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the two newly independent post-Soviet 
republics. Yet, in 2015, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) entered into force with 
Armenia as a full member, the longest running conflict in the South Caucasus 
became more intense, and Azerbaijan is holding more opposition members, 
journalists and human rights defenders in detention than Russia and Belarus 
combined.1 
Although negotiations of a new framework agreement with Armenia were launched 
on 7 December 2015, the EU’s relations with Azerbaijan were at their all-time low just 
three months ago.2 The critical resolution adopted by the European Parliament in 
September 2015 was soon followed by the cancellation of the visit by the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) to Baku and “the withdrawal of Azerbaijan from the 
Euronest Parliamentary Assembly“.3 The draft Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) 
that Azerbaijan presented to the EU during the Riga Summit in May 2015 is still on 
stand-by.4 So long as a new agreement with Azerbaijan and an EEU-compatible 
agreement with Armenia are to be negotiated, the EU’s relations with both remain 
regulated by their Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) of 1999.5 
Previous research has conceptualised the process of how EU norms and values are 
exported to third countries outside the framework of enlargement. By focusing on the 
act of transposition and the EU as the starting point for change, the literature has 
“reduced the role of domestic factors [in these countries] to mere intervening 
variables”.6 This paper seeks to fill this gap by analysing the domestic factors that 
1 Abramowitz, Morton et al., “Open Letter Regarding the Human Rights Situation in 
Azerbaijan”, 13 April 2015, p. 1. 
2 European External Action Service, “EU and Armenia launch negotiations for a new 
agreement”, Press Release, Brussels, 7 December 2015. 
3 European Parliament resolution of 18 September 2014 on the persecution of human rights 
defenders in Azerbaijan; E. Mamadov, “EU and Azerbaijan: Breaking Up or Muddling 
Through?”, Eurasianet, 16 September 2015. 
4 F. Huseinzadeh , “A summit of discord”, Foreign Policy News, 25 June 2015. 
5 European Commission, “The EU’s bilateral trade and investment agreements – where are 
we?”, Memo, Brussels, 3 December 2013; EEAS website, retrieved 19 October 2015, 
eeas.europa.eu/azerbaijan/index_en.htm; eeas.europa.eu/armenia/index_en.htm.  
6 L. Delcour & K. Wolczuk, “The EU's Unexpected ‘Ideal Neighbour’? The Perplexing Case of 
Armenia’s Europeanisation”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 37, no. 4, 2015, p. 492. 
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may have limited the EU’s influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan under the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The author argues that the domestic conditions under 
which countries undergo an institutional change are more instrumental in 
understanding the reasons for the success or failure of the EU’s external action than 
the EU’s internal structures or foreign policy models are.  
Combining explanations drawn from the approaches of external governance, norm 
diffusion and structural foreign policy, the paper looks into domestic political 
characteristics that obstruct the EU’s ability to induce a democratisation process in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. In other words, the author analyses whether domestic 
political factors in the two countries meet certain conditions identified in the three 
theories, in the presence of which an externally incentivised policy is more likely to be 
implemented. The hypothesis put forward is that the EU’s democracy promotion in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan has not been successful because the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) does not take into account the countries’ domestic political structures. 
The paper is divided into three parts: the first part presents the three theories and 
deduces the domestic factors that will then be applied in the case studies. In the 
second part the case studies on the domestic political structures are carried out. The 
third part provides an analysis of the key findings and makes an effort to rationalise 
them through arguments of path dependence, the ‘stabilisation-democratisation 
dilemma’ and the ‘paradox of authoritarian elections’. 
 
Theoretical Conditions for the EU’s External Influence 
External governance, structural foreign policy and norm diffusion were all inspired by 
traditional International Relations theories, comparative politics and Europeanisation 
studies which, by the late 1990s, had expanded their focus from EU member states to 
countries participating in the accession process, potential candidates, Norway and 
Switzerland. This paved the way for several authors who then assayed to give 
meaning to how EU rules are transferred to non-member states, using tools from the 
ideas of policy transfer, transnational diffusion, institutional isomorphism, structural 
power or soft power. This section presents the arguments made by three theories, 
and highlights the key takeaways for the case studies that follow. They all emphasise 
certain characteristics in the presence of which an externally incentivised policy is 
more likely to be implemented. 
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External Governance 
Defined as a form of interdependence where the EU’s internal rules are extended 
beyond the borders of its formal membership, the external governance approach 
provides a framework for understanding how third countries are integrated into the 
European system of rules.7 It relies on the projection of ‘soft power’, explaining the 
way in which the EU rules are adopted by third countries in the so-called ‘soft security 
areas’, such as justice and home affairs, energy policy and environmental policy.8 
External governance has a horizontal rather than vertical nature, inclusive rather 
than exclusive character, it focuses on process rather than output, and emphasises 
voluntarism as opposed to legal obligations.9 
There are three ways in which external governance can take place: in a 
hierarchical, market and networked mode. The hierarchical mode is found in a 
relationship of domination and subordination, based on non-negotiable unilaterally 
enforceable rules, collectively binding prescriptions and supranational authoritative 
law.10 This is mostly associated with the Community method and the prescriptive 
qualities of EU law in its enlargement policy.11 In the market mode, “outcomes are 
the result of competition between formally autonomous actors”, found, for example, 
in the extension of the principle of mutual recognition in the Single Market to the 
European Economic Area.12 In its external relations, the EU tends to rely mostly on the 
networked mode of governance where actors are considered formally equal and 
relationships are formed around a voluntary agreement through the process of 
interaction, negotiations and bargaining.13 
The mode and effectiveness of the EU’s external governance is determined by a list 
of conditions which is the most intriguing part of the theory, summed up in Table 1 
below. First, according to the institutionalist explanation, the quality of existing EU 
institutions, the method of rule transfer, the consistency of the EU’s offer, the 
7 S. Lavenex & F. Schimmelfennig, “EU Rules Beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External 
Governance in European Politics”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 16, no. 6, 2009, pp. 
791-812. 
8 S. Lavenex, “EU External Governance in ‘Wider Europe’”, Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol. 11, no. 4, 2004, pp. 680-700. 
9 S. Lavenex, “A Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy: 
Integration Beyond Conditionality?”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 15, no. 6, 2008, p. 
940. 
10 Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, op. cit., p. 797. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 799. 
13 Ibid., pp. 795-798, 807. 
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allocation of rewards and the support for an EU rule among its own members 
circumscribe the credibility and the effectiveness of its external governance (see 
Table 1).14 For example, as a method of rule transfer, social learning or lesson-
drawing is more likely to be accepted in third countries, while external incentives and 
bargaining can cause domestic resistance and poor implementation.15 
 
Table 1: Conditions under which external governance is more likely to be effective 
EXPLANATION CONDITIONS 
Institutionalist 
Rules that are transferred through social learning or lesson-drawing are 
less contested domestically 
The more an EU rule is complied with within the EU, the more likely third 
countries will accept it 
Cost-benefit calculations of target governments depend on the 
consistency of the EU offer 
Power-based 
Effectiveness of EU external governance varies with international 
structures of power 
If mutual interdependence between the EU and third countries is high, 
external governance is more likely to be effective 
External governance can only be effective when a target country does 
not have a credible alternative to EU integration 
Domestic factors 
Political conditionality is likely to be effective only in at least partly 
democratised countries with lower domestic adjustment costs 
→ political regime and adjustment costs in third countries 
If EU rules are seen as legitimate, they are more likely to be accepted 
→ perceived legitimacy of EU rules 
Domestically compatible EU rules are more likely to be accepted 
Source: compiled by the author, based on Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, op. cit., pp. 791-812; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, op. cit., pp. 669-687; Lavenex, "A Governance Perspective", 
op. cit., pp. 938-955; Lavenex, "EU External Governance", op. cit., pp. 680-700. 
 
In the second, power-based approach, “the modes and effectiveness of EU external 
governance vary with international structures of power and interdependence 
between the EU and third countries” (see Table 1).16 If mutual interdependence is 
high, the EU’s policy is more likely to succeed.17 Moreover, the effectiveness of 
14 Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, op. cit., p. 802; F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier, 
“Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe“, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 4, 2004, pp. 674, 682. 
15 Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, op. cit., p. 682. 
16 Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, op. cit., p. 804. 
17 Ibid. 
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externalisation is limited by possible competing global or regional ‘governance 
providers’, such as the United States, Russia or the United Nations.18 
The third explanation emphasises the role of domestic factors in target countries, 
according to which the effectiveness of externalisation is conditioned by the 
structures of the domestic political regime, the perceived legitimacy of the EU’s rules, 
and their compatibility with domestic rules, traditions and practices (see Table 1).19 
First, the political regime is linked to the cost of rule adoption, meaning that reform-
minded governments in at least partly democratised countries are more likely to 
adopt the EU rules than authoritarian states where democratic adjustment costs are 
higher.20 Second, the perceived legitimacy of EU rules is seen as a prerequisite for 
third countries to select and implement external rules as a basis for cooperation with 
the EU.21 Third, the EU rules are more likely to be adopted if they are compatible with 
the countries’ domestic institutions. 
In sum, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig have identified nine factors that condition the 
mode and effectiveness of the EU’s external governance by either one of the three 
explanations. The one based on domestic factors provides key takeaways for the 
case studies in this paper, two of which are selected as a basis for case studies. The 
third one, the EU rules’ compatibility with domestic institutions would require an 
extensive comparative analysis that falls out of the scope of this paper. A provisional 
judgment on this compatibility can also be derived from the analysis of the political 
regime – a factor that conditions the EU’s norm diffusion as well. 
 
Norm Diffusion 
Combining behavioural underpinnings with ideas of transnational diffusion, Börzel 
and Risse vindicate how the EU’s influence brings about institutional change in third 
countries via norm diffusion.22 They define institutions as “social structures and systems 
18 Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, op. cit., p. 674; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, op. cit., p. 803. 
19 Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, op. cit., p. 804. 
20 Ibid., p. 807; M. Emerson, G. Noutcheva & N. Popescu, “European Neighbourhood Policy 
Two Years on: Time Indeed for an ‘ENP Plus’”, Centre for European Policy Studies, Policy Brief, 
no. 126, March 2007, p. 6. 
21 Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, op. cit., p. 807. 
22 T. A. Börzel & T. Risse, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction”, West European 
Politics, vol. 35, no. 1, 2012, pp. 1-19; T. A. Börzel & T. Risse, “The Transformative Power of 
Europe: The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas”, KFG Working Paper Series, no. 1, 
Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) The Transformative Power of Europe, Freie Universität Berlin, May 
2009, pp. 5-8. 
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of rules, both formal and informal”23 and diffusion as “a process through which ideas, 
normative standards, or [...] policies and institutions spread across time and space”.24 
The EU’s norm diffusion, that is, changes in the aforementioned structures and 
systems that can be traced to an EU action or policy, takes place through direct or 
indirect mechanisms that vary according to geographic proximity and interdepend-
ence between the EU and a third country.25 In case of indirect emulation, actors in 
their quest for overcoming a crisis or solving a problem look for best practices, 
thereby incentivising action at the receiving end.26 Norm diffusion is expected to 
occur under four scope conditions that “are likely to affect domestic [...] change in 
response to the promotion or emulation of EU ideas”, summarised in Table 2 below.27  
 
Table 2: Scope conditions for institutional change 
CONDITIONS DEFINITION 
Domestic incentives: 
(non-)liberal reform 
coalitions 
Liberal or non-liberal reform coalitions can be empowered by 
EU conditionality by using EU demands either to pressure for 
domestic reform or to further their own interests 
Degree of statehood: 
state capacity 
The more limited the statehood, the less likely diffusion leads to 
sustainable institutional change; or domestic actors adopt EU 
solutions to increase their legitimacy 
Regime type: 
democracy vs autocracy 
The more democratic a country is, the more likely it emulates 
EU institutions 
Power (a)symmetries If the economic and political relationship between the EU and 
a third country is more balanced/horizontal, the EU has less 
hierarchical leverage to impose its structures 
Source: compiled by the author, based on Börzel & Risse, “When Europeanization Meets 
Diffusion”, op. cit., pp. 192-207; Börzel & Risse, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion”, op. cit., pp. 
1-19; and Börzel & Risse, “The Transformative Power of Europe”, op. cit., pp. 1-29. 
 
First, change is “unlikely to take place unless domestic actors in politics or society 
take them [EU rules] up and demand reforms themselves”, especially in countries 
where the EU does not enjoy much of a leverage.28 Conversely, the EU can 
empower both, liberal and non-liberal forces: liberal coalitions may use EU 
conditionality to insist on domestic liberal reforms, while authoritarian elites can use it 
to “push their own political agenda, please their constituencies [...] or consolidate 
23 Börzel & Risse, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion”, op. cit., p. 3. 
24 Ibid., p. 5. 
25 Ibid., pp. 1-19; Börzel & Risse, “The Transformative Power of Europe”, op. cit., pp. 9-14. 
26 Börzel & Risse, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion”, op. cit., p. 5. 
27 Ibid., p. 3. 
28 Ibid., p. 11. 
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power”.29 Second, the degree of statehood or state capacity – a combination of 
coercive capacity (monopoly of violence) and administrative effectiveness (ability 
to enforce the law)30 – determines the government’s ability to change institutions, 
whereas the EU appears to be “less inclined to push for domestic change in states 
whose institutions are already fragile”.31 
Third, the democratic quality of a regime “influences the willingness of state actors to 
promote domestic change in response to EU influence”, especially with regard to 
human rights, the rule of law and market economy which threaten the survival of an 
existing authoritarian regime.32 The regime type also resonates with the first condition: 
in more authoritarian regimes, “liberal reform coalitions are [...] too weak vis-à-vis 
nationalist or post-socialist forces to get empowered by the EU”.33 
By bringing in the EU, norm diffusion transcends the domestic sphere and proposes 
power (a)symmetries as the fourth condition for institutional change. The economic 
and political relationship between the EU and a third country undoubtedly has a 
great impact on the EU’s success in introducing its norms. However, the three 
conditions on certain domestic structures of a ‘recipient’ country will be more likely 
to contribute to this paper which aims to provide a domestic explanation to the EU’s 
limited influence. Domestic structures are also the basis for structural foreign policy 
which attributes key importance to sustainability. 
 
Structural Foreign Policy 
Structural foreign policy (SFP) approaches the EU’s influence via ‘structures’ in third 
countries which Keukeleire and Delreux define as “organising principles, institutions, 
norms that shape and order the various interrelated sectors in a society” on 
individual, societal, state, inter-societal, interstate or regional, and international 
levels.34 Highlighting connections between people, such as extended families, tribes, 
clans or religious groupings makes the societal level the most captivating part of the 
29 T. A. Börzel & T. Risse, “When Europeanization Meets Diffusion: Exploring New Territory”, West 
European Politics, vol. 35, no. 1, 2012, p. 199. 
30 D. Andersen et al., “State Capacity and Political Regime Stability”, Democratization, vol. 21, 
no. 7, 2014, pp. 1306-1307. 
31 Börzel & Risse, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion”, op. cit., p. 12. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Börzel & Risse, “When Europeanization Meets Diffusion”, op. cit., p. 199. 
34 S. Keukeleire & T. Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2nd edition, 2014, pp. 28-29. 
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theory, especially when societal structures in a third country do not meet Western 
standards.35 Conducted over a long-term period of time and aiming to reach 
sustainable results, the purpose of SFP is to influence or shape these structures by 
either promoting change, tackling problems or, less ambitiously, supporting existing 
structures.36 Sustainability, in turn, is conditional on three determinants, summed up in 
Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Determinants of sustainable effects of a structural foreign policy 
DEFINITION CONDITIONS 
The policy can only be sustainable if it is 
comprehensive or at least takes various 
interrelated sectors and levels into account 
The number of sectors and levels 
addressed by the policy 
Structures (or changes) are only internalised if 
they are perceived as desirable and legitimate 
Perceived legitimacy of external structures 
and desirability of internalising them 
Structural foreign policy is more likely to be 
successful, if it is complemented by relational 
foreign policy 
Combination of structural and relational 
foreign policy 
Source: compiled by the author, based on Keukeleire & Delreux, op. cit. 
 
First, the results of SFP are sustainable only when the policy takes various inter-
connected sectors and levels into account.37 This is not to say that a foreign policy 
must address all sectors and levels in order to be successful, but a policy that focuses 
on few levels or sectors is less likely to lead to sustainable results.38 Second, for 
external structures to be internalised, they must be perceived as legitimate and 
desirable by the people.39 For instance, the EU’s policy in Central and Eastern 
European countries in the 1990s can be seen as a successful SFP because both the 
population and political elites supported the idea of democratic and economic 
development, regardless of the cost of reforms.40  
Third, in order to increase the likelihood of a successful SFP, it must be complemented 
by what Keukeleire and Delreux call ‘relational foreign policy’, meaning traditional 
foreign policy instruments of diplomacy, both declaratory and operational.41 
Conducting a successful SFP that takes all these conditions into account is beyond 
35 Keukeleire & Delreux, op. cit., p. 31. 
36 Ibid., pp. 28-30. 
37 Ibid., p. 30. 
38 Ibid., pp. 30, 329. 
39 Ibid., pp. 30, 330. 
40 Ibid., p. 330. 
41 Ibid., pp. 27, 328. 
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the capacity of most individual states, making the EU a potential locus for 
developing such a policy.42 Although SFP offers few conditions for the purpose of this 
research (see Table 3), its cross-cutting emphasis on political structures on the state 
and societal levels can be telling when applied to the case studies on Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, and is thus included in Table 4 as one of the conditions. Table 4 gathers 
the domestic factors that any of the three theories sees as conditioning the 
effectiveness of an external policy. 
 
Table 4: Conditions for the effectiveness of an external policy 
CONDITIONS Armenia Azerbaijan 
Political regime – democracy or autocracy  
(external governance theory and norm diffusion)   
State capacity 
(norm diffusion theory)   
Political structures on the state and societal levels 
(structural foreign policy)   
Domestic incentives – liberal reform coalitions 
(norm diffusion theory)   
Perceived legitimacy of EU rules and desirability of internalising them 
(external governance theory and structural foreign policy)   
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
This list provides a basis for the case studies below where the political regime, state 
capacity, political structures on the state and societal levels, domestic incentives 
and the perceived legitimacy of EU rules are studied on the examples of Azerbaijan 
and Armenia. After examining the two cases, the third part of the paper attempts to 
explain the way the findings affect the extent to which the EU is able to induce a 
domestic change. 
  
Case Studies 
The cases of Azerbaijan and Armenia illustrate how different yet interconnected 
domestic developments can lead to the same result in terms of the EU's influence. 
Both countries share the totalitarian past of the Soviet Union, neither of them has ever 
been fully democratic, but since the ceasefire on Nagorno-Karabakh came into 
force in 1994, the countries have evolved in distinct directions. Azerbaijan has 
42 Keukeleire & Delreux, op. cit., p. 30. 
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increased its military budget more than 8000% – from nearly 44 million to more than 
3’583 million US dollars in 2014 – and Armenia, not enjoying the vast natural resources 
that would enable such an increase in defence expenditure, has signed a 
partnership with Russia and participates actively in the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation.43 
 
Azerbaijan: Semi-authoritarianism Fuelled by Oil Revenues 
Azerbaijan’s oil resources have had an enormous impact on the country’s economic 
development, but unlike in other oil-rich countries where high levels of corruption 
and huge oil revenues are usually marred with high societal inequalities, poverty has 
decreased rapidly in Azerbaijan.44 There are aspects about its political regime and 
state structures where the oil industry has played a major role as well. 
Political Regime 
The President enjoys exclusive powers by the constitution, while democratic 
institutions, such as the parliament, judiciary, political opposition and media are 
deemed decorative, weak or marginalised.45 Although a constitutional separation of 
powers exists, it is the executive power that dominates in reality.46 Scholars 
characterise Azerbaijan’s political regime as (semi-)authoritarian, sultanistic, or 
hybrid, or see a transition from a democracy-oriented rule towards an autocracy.47 
At the same time, the leaders have bestowed a fair amount of stability to the 
political regime since the early 1990s.48 
The principal aim back then was to build stability and security in a country that left 
the Soviet Union in an ongoing conflict with Armenia, fearing the politicisation of its 
energy resources and anticipating limited success in state-building and economic 
development.49 Then, Azerbaijani authorities prioritised stabilisation over ‘the burden 
43 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, retrieved 7 December 2015, www.sipri.org/research/ 
armaments/milex/milex_database. 
44 World Bank, Azerbaijan, retrieved 9 October 2015, data.worldbank.org/country/azerbaijan. 
45 F. Guliyev, “Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semiauthoritarianism? An 
Attempt at Conceptualization”, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 
vol. 13, no. 3, 2005, p. 418; S. Abbasov, “Azerbaijan: Achievements and Missed Opportunities”, 
in Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, South Caucasus – 20 Years of Independence, 2012, p. 108. 
46 Guliyev, “Post-Soviet Azerbaijan", op. cit., p. 418. 
47 Ibid., p. 395; Abbasov, op. cit., p. 108. 
48 Guliyev, “Post-Soviet Azerbaijan", op. cit., p. 395. 
49 A. Yunusov, “Twenty Years of Independence in Azerbaijan”, in Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, South 
Caucasus – 20 Years of Independence, 2011, p. 67. 
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of democracy’,50 until a production-sharing agreement was signed in 1994 between 
the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan and the Western Oil Consortium of 13 
companies. This ‘Contract of the Century’51 was soon followed by an enormous 
economic growth that changed the initial rationale behind prioritising stabilisation 
over political change. Now, modernisation is equated with technological innovation 
and translating extensive oil revenues into an ‘Azerbaijani miracle’ rather than 
corresponding to political liberalisation or democratisation.52 Political stability was 
well achieved and so was nepotism. 
Only members of the President’s family, personal connections or people loyal to the 
leadership run political institutions, head major corporations or are promoted to 
leading positions in the government.53 The perpetuity of the ruling elite is furthered by 
a combination of hereditary succession of power and patronage.54 Almost exclusive 
authority over deciding how money from the State Oil Fund is spent enables the 
President to practice neopatrimonialism in exchange for political loyalty.55 Members 
of the elite whose fortunes depend on their connections with the leadership, tend 
not to oppose this arrangement either and, in effect, might even be more interested 
in the continuation of these practices than in the implementation of the rule of law.56 
As a result, the political elite is united by the recognition that any changes to the 
regime would mean a loss for all of them. Hence, underlying political structures have 
remained unchanged for decades. 
State Capacity 
Azerbaijan is effectively operating its strong coercive capacity by taking 
preventative measures against potential threats from within. In 2005, fearing the spill-
over of the ‘colour revolutions’ in Ukraine and Georgia, members of the opposition 
50 A. Geybullayeva, “Azerbaijan and the Burden of Democracy”, Al Jazeera, 11 May 2014. 
51 Official website of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, retrieved 2 May 2015, 
en.president.az/azerbaijan/contract. 
52 Abbasov, op. cit., p. 119. 
53 Q. Reed, “Regulating Conflicts of Interest in Challenging Environments: The Case of 
Azerbaijan”, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Issue 2, 2010, p. 11. 
54 V. Guseynov, “Алиев после Алиева: наследование власти как способ ее удержания” 
[“Aliyev after Aliyev: Hereditary Succession of Power as a Means to Keep it”], Независимая, 
[“Nezavisimaya”],19 March 2004. 
55 F. Guliyev, “Oil and Political Stability in Azerbaijan: The Role of Policy Learning”, Caucasus 
Analytical Digest, no. 47, 18 February 2013, p. 9. 
56 F. Guliyev, “Political Elites in Azerbaijan”, in A. Heinrich & H. Pleines (eds.), Challenges of the 
Caspian Resource Boom. Domestic Elites and Policy-Making, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012, pp. 128-129. 
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were jailed even before they took action and all orange material in shopping 
centres in Baku was confiscated in order to prevent mobilising opposition groups 
from using it.57 Throughout the process, security forces remained loyal to the 
leadership, as opposed to defecting to the opposition as many of them did in 
Georgia and Ukraine, and a ‘colour revolution’ never materialised in Azerbaijan.58 At 
the same time, economic boom, rapidly decreasing poverty and a growing middle 
class have made the people even less susceptible to revolutions.59 
Political Structures on the State and Societal Levels  
Informal practices on the state level reflect a widespread region- and network-
based kinship on the societal level, referred to as ‘clans’.60 The political elite consist of 
two major clans: descendants of former immigrants from Armenia called ‘Yeraz’ 
(Yerevan Azerbaijanis) and the people from the Nakhichevan region – an enclave in 
the South Western part of the country where the President’s family is from.61 This tribal 
affiliation has an enormous impact on the country’s political affairs where the 
Nakhichevan clan has been in power since 1993 when Heydar Aliyev “entrusted all 
important national and regional posts to his clansmen and family members” and 
created a system of power distribution between the different clans in order to defuse 
potential rivalries and ensure the survival of the regime to ‘preserve his legacy’.62 Not 
only has this ‘balance of powers’ à la Aliyev solidified the sustainability of the political 
regime, but it also shows that “family, cronies, clans, and patronage are more 
influential social constructions than formal legal institutions”.63 
What further dictates political debate, reform process and even the rise and fall of 
governments in Baku, is the course and development of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict.64 The war has either been used by the governments as an excuse for not 
implementing certain reforms or by the opposition in an attempt to increase their 
57 V. Bunce & S. Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 181. 
58 L. Way, “The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 19, no. 3, 
2008, pp. 55-69. 
59 Andersen et al., op. cit., p. 1305. 
60 S. Radnitz, “Oil in the Family: Managing Presidential Succession in Azerbaijan”, 
Democratization, vol. 19, no. 1, 2012, p. 64. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Radnitz, op. cit., p. 64; L.-C. Sim, “In Search of Security: Azerbaijan and the Role of Oil in the 
Caspian Sea”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 15, no. 3, 1999, p. 28. 
63 Radnitz, op. cit., p. 65; Guliyev, “Post-Soviet Azerbaijan”, op. cit., p. 416. 
64 M. Grigoryan & S. Rzayev, “Between Freedom and Taboo: Media Coverage of the 
Karabakh Conflict”, Accord, no. 17, 2005, p. 50. 
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political capital.65 At the same time, Karabakh democratisation efforts and the 
argument of their incompatibility with the values of Azerbaijan’s political culture are 
used by Karabakh Armenians to support their plea for international recognition. 66 This 
makes the societal impact of the way in which the conflict is communicated by 
political elites on both sides of the front line all the more multi-faceted. 
Domestic Incentives  
Before President Ilham Aliyev took office in 2003, his father actually opened up the 
political regime which – although primarily intended to facilitate his son’s rise to 
power – resulted in Azerbaijan having a more active civil society than most post-
Soviet countries did at that time.67 Even pro-Western liberal opposition parties existed 
until 2003: they participated in the parliamentary elections in 1995 and 2000, and ran 
alternative presidential candidates in 2003.68 This earned the country an evaluation 
of ‘partly free’ by Freedom House between 1998 and 2003.69  
Yet, shortly after Ilham Aliyev won the elections, the coercive capacity was enacted 
again: security forces were deployed pre-emptively, the most popular opposition 
candidate Isa Gambar was arrested along with several protesters and political 
repressions of liberal reform groups continued.70 Occasionally, small liberal coalitions 
emerge but lack funding and opportunities to challenge the regime from within, for 
which some authors hold the West accountable: civil society organisations are mostly 
funded and controlled by the state and do not enjoy sufficient support from 
international actors.71 Recently, some experts have assumed that Islamic 
communities could be emerging as a new political force, but the extent to which 
65 Sim, op. cit., pp. 29-30. 
66 N. Caspersen, “Separatism and Democracy in the Caucasus”, Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy, vol. 50, no. 4, 2008, pp. 123, 127; L. Broers, “The Politics of Non-Recognition and 
Democratization”, Accord, no. 17, 2005, p. 71. 
67 Abbasov, op. cit., p. 121; Yunusov, op. cit., pp. 71-75; B. Shaffer, “Young Leader or an 
Affront to Democracy?”, Letter to Wall Street Journal, Belfer Center Programs or Projects: 
Caspian Studies, 12 November 2002. 
68 Radnitz, op. cit., p. 63; Bunce & Wolchik, op. cit., p. 181. 
69 Freedom House, Freedom in the World, retrieved 19 October 2015, 
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2003/azerbaijan. 
70 Radnitz, op. cit., p. 67. 
71 Ibid., p. 69. 
16 
                                                 
Annika Tartes 
they could be empowered by the EU’s conditionality appears remote.72 For the time 
being, the regime simply imprisons pro-Western secular liberals.73 
Perceived Legitimacy of EU Rules 
As far as the desirability of internalising EU norms is concerned, Baku is not interested 
in an Association Agreement such as the ones signed with Ukraine, Georgia or 
Moldova.74 Instead, democracy is regarded as something that should have a certain 
‘national flavour’ and not seen as a universal value, leaving Azerbaijan’s political 
elite uninterested in aligning with EU political norms and mistrustful of external efforts 
to democratise the country.75 In recent years, the perception of the EU among the 
authorities, as well as the population, has suffered in particular because of three 
issues: the Eurozone crisis, the EU’s avoidance of criticism of human rights violations 
and response to the annexation of Crimea. 
First, Azerbaijan does not see the EU as a model for development and modernisation: 
the country’s annual GDP growth of 3% even in the situation of falling oil prices is still 
higher than the EU average.76 Second, not only does the country’s booming 
economy ensure its independence from external assistance, and thus resilience to 
international criticism, but its booming oil industry has made the situation of 
democracy in Azerbaijan subordinate to the EU’s energy interests. After all, 
Azerbaijan is “the site of the largest energy contract signed since the end of the Cold 
War, and an ally sharing the West’s goal of reducing Russia’s influence in Eurasia”.77 
Regardless of electoral frauds and human rights violations, the EU has never stopped 
its dialogue with the authorities as it did with Belarus in 1997.78  
Third, advocating for the inviolability of internationally recognised borders and 
territorial integrity of Ukraine, while avoiding referring to the same principles in the 
72 Abbasov, op. cit., p. 121; Yunusov, op. cit., pp. 71-75. 
73 E. Mamadov, “Azerbaijan and the EU: Bogged Down in Acrimony”, Eurasianet, 4 December 
2014. 
74 Mamadov, “EU and Azerbaijan”, op. cit. 
75 Abbasov, op. cit., p. 119; N. Popescu, “Keeping the Eastern Partnership on Track”, EUISS 
Alert, no. 29, 6 September 2013, p. 2. 
76 N. Bagirova & M. Antidze, “Azerbaijan’s Economic Growth Slows to 3 pct in 2014 due to 
Weaker Oil Price”, Reuters, 12 January 2015; World Bank, retrieved 19 October 2015, 
wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1. 
77 Radnitz, op. cit., p. 70. 
78 Z. Rasulzade, “Игбал Агазаде: ‘Азербайджан – не Сирия, а И.Алиев – не Асад’ (наши 
беседы)” [Iqbal Aghazadeh: “Azerbaijan – not Syria, and Aliyev – not Assad” (our 
conversation)], Haqqin, 30 January 2015. 
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case of Nagorno-Karabakh, has encouraged accusations of double standards on 
the part of Azerbaijan. President Aliyev has repeatedly criticised the West for 
imposing "sanctions against Russia for its occupation of Crimea and support of 
separatism in the Donbas while it has never considered sanctions against Armenia for 
the occupation of Karabakh”.79 Although Armenians likewise expect the EU to 
support the principle of self-determination to support their case on Nagorno-
Karabakh, their perception of the EU was less damaged by recent developments. 
 
Armenia: Reform Interests Constrained by Geopolitical Issues 
The EU’s model of market economy still appeals to Armenians, even though they are 
now constrained by the country’s membership in the EEU. This membership will not be 
easy: Armenia is comparably poorer than other EEU member states (Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan), it does not share a land border with any of them, and its 
simultaneous WTO membership further complicates the issue of compensating the 
differences of tariffs for Armenia's already strained state budget.80 In December 2015, 
the first talks since September 2013 are held to discuss a new framework agreement 
with the EU, but the past two years are still symptomatic of the enormous impact that 
Russia has on the country. 
Political Regime 
On 6 December 2015, Armenians voted on constitutional reforms that will transform 
the country from a semi-presidential political system into a parliamentary republic, 
change the parliamentary election system, and shift most of the power from the 
President to the Prime Minister.81 Looking at the opposition’s claims that the reforms 
are intended to consolidate the grip on power of the current ruling conservative 
party Hayastani Hanrapetakan Kusaktsutyun (HHK), the term ‘competitive 
authoritarianism’ becomes quite telling.82 This term refers to regimes where political 
79 A. Valiyev, “Azerbaijan’s Balancing Act in the Ukraine Crisis”, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, 
no. 352, September 2014, p. 2. 
80 M. Zolyan, “An Offer Yerevan Could Not Refuse”, BTI Blog, 6 October 2014. 
81 L. Fuller, “How Democratic Are Proposed Armenian Constitutional Amendments?”, Radio 
Free Europe, 5 December 2015. 
82 Ibid. 
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opposition exists but “the rules of the competition are tilted in a way, which favours 
the incumbent political force”.83  
The political rivalry became especially intense in February 2015, when the leader of 
the HHK and the current President Serzh Sargsyan confronted Gagik Tsarukyan, the 
leader of the second largest party Bargavach Hayastan Kusakcutyun (BHK) and one 
of the wealthiest men in the country.84 This is argued to have been intended to 
eliminate opposition to the constitutional reform that would ensure HHK the majority 
of seats in the parliamentary elections in 2017.85 In effect, HHK is accused of seeking 
to monopolise the political arena and although BHK presents itself as opposition, they 
too are criticised for stemming from various elite groups just like HHK is.86  
Despite elitist pluralism, the political system is nevertheless based on consensus and 
coalitions.87 This could be attributed to the separation of powers by the constitution. 
In reality, however, the ruling party maintains influence over the judiciary, members 
of the parliament head business corporations, and thus, the actual power is 
concentrated around three key figures: President Serzh Sargsyan and the two former 
Presidents Robert Kocharyan and Levon Ter-Petrosyan.88 An overlap between 
economic and political interests evolved in the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
war that exhausted the impoverished post-Soviet Republic of Armenia and led to the 
distribution of influence zones, licenses and access to resources, as a result of which 
businesspeople and oligarchs became key actors in politics.89  
State Capacity 
Some say that Armenia is the best example of a strong coercive state in the former 
Soviet Union, having successfully captured 20% of the territory of Azerbaijan by 
83 M. Zolyan, “From a Hybrid Regime to Authoritarianism? Armenian Politics in the Wake of the 
Destruction of the ‘Prosperous Armenia Party’”, Regional Studies Centre Blog, no. 2, 17 March 
2015. 
84 H. Arshamyan, “ՄԻԱԲԵՎԵՌ ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆ ՀԱՄԱԿԱՐԳԻ ՇԵՄԻՆ” [Facing a Unipolar 
Political System], Regional Studies Centre Staff Analysis, vol. 4, no. 1, February 2015. 
85 Ibid. 
86 D. Petrosyan, “The Political System of Armenia: Form and Content”, Caucasus Analytical 
Digest, no. 17, 21 May 2010, p. 10; A. Iskandaryan, “From Totalitarianism via Elitist Pluralism: 
Wither Armenia?”, in M. Palonkorpi & A. Iskandaryan (eds.), Armenia’s Foreign and Domestic 
Politics: Development Trends, Yerevan, Caucasus Institute and Aleksanteri Institute, 2013, pp. 
49, 54. 
87 Iskandaryan, “From Totalitarianism via Elitist Pluralism”, op. cit., p. 54; Petrosyan, op. cit., p. 9. 
88 Petrosyan, op. cit., p. 9. 
89 Iskandaryan, “From Totalitarianism via Elitist Pluralism”, op. cit., p. 52. 
19 
                                                 
EU Diplomacy Paper 9/2015 
1994.90 The 1992-94 Nagorno-Karabakh war provided Armenian leaders “with a force 
that has the experience, the stomach, and the cohesion to put down one of the 
most mobilised oppositions in the postcommunist world”.91 Despite being able to 
suppress large-scale opposition unrest, Armenia’s administrative capacity relies on a 
combination of loose coalitions of competitive parties and is therefore vulnerable to 
defections from within.92 The country’s foreign policy choices are limited by its 
geopolitical isolation due to closed borders with two of its four neighbours 
(Azerbaijan and Turkey) and its high dependence on Russia. All of Armenia’s key 
sectors, from telecommunications, banking and transport to electricity, energy and 
security, are shaped by Russian investment, even if this relationship is driven by 
political pressure and hard pragmatism.93 Considering that Russia’s low-price gas 
distribution and security guarantee with respect to Azerbaijan is an offer that the EaP 
cannot match, and that all other issues are subordinate to security in Armenia’s 
national priorities, the fear of having to compromise its security is part of what 
encouraged Armenia’s ‘U-turn’ in 2013.94 
At the same time, the need to simultaneously coordinate policies so as to avoid 
clashes between domestic political groups while “trying to profitably combine the 
interests of Russia, the United States, the European Union, and Iran, which largely 
oppose each other on regional issues” – often referred to as a foreign policy of 
‘complementarity’ – has made the country’s political leaders extremely skilful at 
operating a modus vivendi.95 
90 Way, op. cit., p. 63. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., pp. 67-68. 
93 M. Emerson & H. Kostanyan, “Putin’s Grand Design to Destroy the EU’s Eastern Partnership 
and Replace it with a Disastrous Neighbourhood Policy of His Own”, The Centre for European 
Policy Studies Commentary, 2013, p. 1; N. Babayan, “Armenia: Why the European 
Neighbourhood Policy has Failed”, FRIDE Policy Brief, no. 68, February 2011, p. 2; S. Minasyan, 
“Russian-Armenian Relations: Affection or Pragmatism?”, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, no. 
269, July 2013, p. 3. 
94 A. Iskandaryan, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy: Where Values Meet Constraints”, in M. 
Palonkorpi & A. Iskandaryan (eds.), Armenia’s Foreign and Domestic Politics: Development 
Trends, Yerevan, Caucasus Institute and Aleksanteri Institute, 2013, pp. 14-15; Babayan, op. 
cit., p. 2; A. Shirinyan & S. Ralchev, “U-turns and Ways Forward: Armenia, the EU and Russia 
Beyond Vilnius”, Policy Brief, Institute of Regional and International Studies, Yerevan-Sofia, 14 
November 2013, pp. 2-3. 
95 Iskandaryan, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy”, op. cit., p. 12; Minasyan, “Russian-Armenian 
Relations”, op. cit., pp. 3-4; Minasyan, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, op. cit., p. 23. 
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Political Structures on the State and Societal Levels 
The aforementioned three Presidents were all involved in the Karabakh movement, 
thus, their entourage has always consisted of “[f]ormer activists [...], combatants, or 
individuals who come from Nagorno-Karabakh or other formerly Armenian-
populated regions of Soviet Azerbaijan”, even today.96 Part of what contributes to 
this continuity of politicians is societal concern over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
A resulting resistance to change stems from Armenians’ perception that their interests 
are best represented and protected by those who experienced the war themselves. 
By the end of the 1990s, veterans of the Nagorno-Karabakh war made up a large 
group of the society, involved in political affairs and regulating the economy, but 
now the veterans are less prominent and function more like a business community.97 
There used to be a group of intellectuals among the leaders of the Karabakh 
movement as well, which now functions as opposition.98 Much like in Azerbaijan, the 
war provides a useful tool in Armenia’s politics as well – either for the coalition to 
adopt a hard line on conflict resolution or for the opposition to criticise the official 
approach as ‘betrayal’, depending on the political situation.99 Conversely, Nagorno-
Karabakh is also the one issue on which the government is not divided.100 
Civil society has gradually developed into institutionalised forms since the mid-1990s, 
along the lines of ‘shrjapat’101 – horizontal networks and communication circles of 
people that were based on common values, lifestyle, social class, profession or 
kinship.102 Yet, the general lack of civic culture and social apathy towards political 
affairs make self-organisation rare and only recent. The state is believed to be 
responsible for providing material well-being to its citizens, which creates a constant 
public demand for leftist parties with paternalistic or even populist programmes, and 
instigates political parties to position themselves as ‘catch-all’ parties rather than to 
have a clear ideology.103 Moreover, there are no parties representing farmers, small 
96 Minasyan, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, op. cit., p. 26; Petrosyan, op. cit., pp. 8-11. 
97 Iskandaryan, “From Totalitarianism via Elitist Pluralism”, op. cit., p. 52. 
98 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
99 Minasyan, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, op. cit., p. 27. 
100 Minasyan, “Domestic Dimensions of Armenia’s Foreign Policy: the Karabakh Conflict and 
Armenia-Turkey Relations”, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, no. 209, June 2012, p. 2. 
101 ‘Surrounding’, ‘environment’ or ‘the circle of people around you’ in English. 
102 H. Mikaelyan, “Civil Society in Armenia”, in M. Palonkorpi & A. Iskandaryan (eds.), 
Armenia’s Foreign and Domestic Politics: Development Trends, Yerevan, Caucasus Institute 
and Aleksanteri Institute, 2013, pp. 58-59, 63. 
103 Mikaelyan, op. cit., pp. 61, 67; Iskandaryan, “From Totalitarianism via Elitist Pluralism”, op. 
cit., p. 48. 
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businesses, retired people or the middle class, because “[t]he country lacks the 
political culture needed to make these strata aware of the need to be 
represented”.104 Many middle class representatives do not even consider it 
necessary to organise themselves and fight for their rights, they either wait for 
problems to be solved by the authorities or emigrate.105 In fact, the disposition to 
emigrate is extremely high among Armenians, not only due to the self-perpetuating 
draw of their diaspora, but also due to the low level of economic development, high 
unemployment, and widespread pessimism about the future.106 
Domestic Incentives 
There are several groups that advocate liberal reforms. For example, the Heritage 
Party Zharangutyun seeks to restore constitutional order and establish impartial 
prosecution of the people involved in post-elections violence in 2008.107 The 
Armenian National Congress demands the release of all political prisoners, free 
competitive TV broadcasting, a reform of the Electoral Code, and the removal of 
restrictions on rallies and gatherings that were imposed in 2008.108 Both became 
especially active before the constitutional referendum, launched a large opposition 
campaign, and organised several rallies in June 2015 and on the week of the 
referendum in December.109 This is quite remarkable, given that most scholars have 
found self-organisation to be rare and Armenians to be rather uninterested in politics. 
These groups have gradually emerged due to “Armenia’s geographical, economic 
and political situation as a small, poor, landlocked country involved in a territorial 
dispute” – a situation in which liberal reforms were considered necessary for the 
country’s stable development.110 Internal urge for overcoming poverty, 
unemployment and inequalities made Armenia notably receptive to the EU’s 
requirements during the negotiations of an Association Agreement including a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) in 2010-2013, when substantial reforms 
104 Iskandaryan, “From Totalitarianism via Elitist Pluralism”, op. cit., p. 49. 
105 Mikaelyan, op. cit., p. 61. 
106 Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
107 Petrosyan, op. cit., p. 11. 
108 Ibid. 
109 K. Avedissian, “No, thanks. Armenia's opposition rallies against referendum”, The Guardian, 
5 December 2015; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Armenian Service, “Thousands Rally In 
Armenia Against Plan To Change Constitution”, Radio Free Europe, 1 December 2015. 
110 Iskandaryan, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy”, op. cit., p. 12. 
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were made in competition policy, migration and food safety.111 This has to do with 
the popular idea of Armenians ‘becoming like Europe’ by “replacing Soviet values 
and practices with modern European ones” which created an incentive for 
implementing many European standards.112 
Perceived Legitimacy of EU Rules 
EU norms find greater resonance within the civil society and the opposition than they 
do among the authorities who focus more on the pragmatic gains of EU integration 
and less on democratic transformation.113 For Armenians, the EU symbolises 
economic well-being – something that they aspire to.114 At the same time, part of 
why the political elite supported the DCFTA negotiations was that it did not require 
large-scale democratic changes that would have endangered the ruling elite.115 
Although the rule of law and human rights remain unattractive to the authorities, 
these values gain their legitimacy from being to some extent seen as instrumental for 
achieving material well-being.116 
The perception of the EU was never damaged by the disillusionment with the lack of 
a membership perspective in the EaP framework, as Armenia never explicitly 
expressed a wish to join the EU. Despite having conducted numerous reforms 
towards greater economic integration with the EU, Armenians were constrained by 
their security calculations in pronouncing it.117 What they were disenchanted with 
was the EU’s contribution to resolving ongoing problems with its neighbours, because 
this is what Armenia was hoping for in its inclusion in the EaP.118 Paradoxically, the 
very inclusion of Armenia in the EaP, following the lack of progress on the ENP Action 
Plan, the crackdowns of flawed presidential elections, police abuse and political 
111 Iskandaryan, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy”, op. cit., p. 16; Delcour & Wolczuk, op. cit., pp. 
495-498. 
112 Iskandaryan, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy”, op. cit., p. 15; Delcour & Wolczuk, op. cit., pp. 
497-498. 
113 N. Babayan & N. Shapovalova, “Armenia: the Eastern Partnership’s Unrequired Suitor”, 
FRIDE Policy Brief, no. 94, September 2011, p. 2. 
114 Iskandaryan, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy”, op. cit., p. 14; L. Delcour, "Faithful but 
Constrained? Armenia’s Half-Hearted Support for Russia’s Regional Integration Policies in the 
Post-Soviet Space", in D. Cadier (ed.), The Geopolitics of Eurasian Economic Integration, 
Special Report, London, London School of Economics, 2014, p. 41. 
115 Delcour & Wolczuk, op. cit., p. 501. 
116 Ibid., p. 494; Iskandaryan, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy”, op. cit., p. 16. 
117 Iskandaryan, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy”, op. cit., p. 12; Delcour & Wolczuk, op. cit., pp. 
502-503. 
118 Emerson & Kostanyan, op. cit., p. 2; Babayan, op. cit., p. 1. 
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arrests in 2008, had many Armenians question “how the EU can classify their country 
as democratic”.119 This, and other outstanding issues revealed in the case studies, are 
summarised in Table 5 below and analysed in the following section. 
 
Table 5: Main Findings 
CONDITIONS ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN 
Political regime 
Competitive, elitist pluralism but 
favours incumbent political force, 
overlap of economic and political 
interests and authoritarian trends 
after 2008 presidential elections 
but based on consensus and 
coalitions 
Semi-authoritarian, elitist, exclusive 
powers of the President, executive 
branch dominates, overlap of 
power and property, elections 
induce authoritarianism, 
executive power dominates 
State capacity 
High coercive and administrative 
capacity, but statehood limited by 
international isolation and 
dependence on Russia 
High coercive and administrative 
capacity, loyal security forces, 
uprisings and opposition 
effectively pre-empted 
Political structures on 
the state and 
societal levels 
Political leaders originating from 
the Karabakh movement, social 
apathy towards politics, 
paternalistic conception of the 
state, lack of civic culture and self-
organisation, high emigration 
mood 
Region- and network-based 
kinship, nepotism, hereditary 
succession of power, clans more 
relevant than formal legal 
institutions 
Domestic incentives 
for liberal reform 
Demand for economic reforms 
and liberalisation, but populist 
political parties with no clear 
ideology, opposition activism prior 
to constitutional referendum 
No interest in political change or 
liberalisation among political elite, 
opposition marginalised, civil 
society repressed and weak 
Perceived legitimacy 
of EU rules 
EU seen as a model for 
modernisation, ‘Europeanisation’ 
as a way for achieving economic 
well-being, reforms made during 
DCFTA negotiations but authorities 
only interested in democratisation 
in so far as it contributes to 
economic development 
Technical innovation and 
economic growth prioritised over 
democratisation, authorities 
uninterested in implementing EU 
standards of democracy, 
perception of the EU damaged 
by selective use of territorial 
integrity argument 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
Analysis of Domestic Conditions and the EU’s Influence 
Semi-authoritarian trends, high state capacity and informal political clan structures 
can be identified in both countries, but when it comes to the perception of the EU 
and domestic incentives for liberal reform, the EaP appears to have a greater 
119 Babayan, op. cit., p. 3. 
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resonance in Armenia than it does in Azerbaijan. However, as much as the case 
studies have found on the political regime, state capacity, political structures, 
domestic incentives and the perception of the EU in the two countries in the South 
Caucasus, each of the fields of research would surely deserve more in-depth analysis 
than this paper could accommodate. The following analysis nevertheless attempts to 
understand the reasons for the main findings of this study, as summarised in Table 5. 
The EU’s ability to foster domestic reform processes is ultimately determined by the 
political regime and leaders in both countries. External governance and norm 
diffusion are more effective in countries that are at least partly democratised, where 
incumbent authorities share the willingness to reform. Indeed, the EaP has had 
greater impact in Armenia where the political system is already based on coalitions 
and competition, than it has in Azerbaijan where the President enjoys almost 
exclusive powers and the political elite has no interest in democratic change that 
would threaten their position (see Table 5). The reforms required in the EaP framework 
imply a series of costs for countries where large-scale changes are needed to 
establish a functioning electoral democracy, which risk making the costs of meeting 
the EU’s norms and values higher than the rewards for these efforts. 
The concept of path dependence provides useful insight into understanding why the 
cost of reforms plays such a key role in the process of democratisation. According to 
Pierson’s concept of ‘increasing returns’, “once a country […] has started down a 
track, the costs of reversal are very high” to the point where further movement in the 
chosen direction is induced.120 Previous institutional behaviour, decisions and 
practices do not only affect future political outcomes, but institutions can even 
become stuck on the course determined in the past, such that political 
arrangements are especially resistant to change.121 On the one hand, with the 
continuity of its political system and former Soviet practices, Azerbaijan appears to 
be trapped in certain path dependence. 
On the other hand, the EU itself is often faced with a ‘democratisation-stabilisation 
dilemma’ of two sometimes mutually exclusive objectives, as promoting 
democratisation in (semi-)authoritarian countries entails a risk of destabilisation, at 
120 P. Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics”, American 
Political Science Review, vol. 94, no. 2, 2000, pp. 251- 267; M. Levi, “A Model, a Method, and a 
Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis”, in M. I. Lichbach & A. S. 
Zuckerman (eds.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 28. 
121 Pierson, op. cit., pp. 251-252, 262. 
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least in the short term.122 “[T]he lower the degree of political liberalisation, the greater 
the risk of destabilisation”, and the more hesitant the EU is to support political 
opponents in asserting a democratic reform agenda, having to favour stability over 
change.123 As a result, “the EU is less likely to […] promote domestic change, […] 
even if this means strengthening authoritarian regimes”.124 Ironically, stabilisation is 
exactly what Azerbaijani leaders have prioritised since 1991 and in some ways the EU 
has supported governments in both countries in achieving that. However, it would be 
naive to assume that the EU, having just set up a joint steering body for the Southern 
Gas Corridor project in February 2015, has refrained from criticising the country’s poor 
human rights record only to avoid destabilising the political system.125 
Börzel and Risse’s presumption of semi-authoritarianism being coupled with low levels 
of state capacity is not particularly convincing in the cases of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.126 Both countries enjoy an impressive coercive capacity, especially at 
times preceding or following elections (see Table 5): in Armenia, restrictions on the 
right of assembly and the freedom of speech were re-established after violent post-
elections protests in 2008; in Azerbaijan, pre-emptive measures against potential 
uprisings are regularly taken prior to elections. Seeing the high state capacity 
coupled with semi-authoritarian trends, the correlation initially proposed by norm 
diffusion becomes questionable. 
As the 2008 presidential elections in Armenia showed, there are some liberal groups 
who become more vocal during the pre-elections campaigning, giving hope with 
regard to mobilising liberal coalitions in the country. However, contrary to praising 
elections as the hallmark of democratisation or a benchmark for testing the quality of 
it, in countries with a high state capacity, elections tend to strengthen the existing 
political regime either way, be it authoritarian or democratic – a phenomenon 
referred to as ‘the paradox of authoritarian elections’.127 This tendency is related to 
the enforcement of an authoritarian style of governance around the time of 
122 T. A. Börzel & V. van Hüllen, “One Voice, One Message, but Conflicting Goals: 
Cohesiveness and Consistency in the European Neighbourhood Policy”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, vol. 21, no. 7, 2014, pp. 1033-1049. 
123 Börzel & van Hüllen, op. cit., p. 1041; R. Balfour & A. Missiroli, “Reassessing the European 
Neighbourhood Policy“, EPC Issue Paper, no. 54, June 2007, p. 11. 
124 Börzel & Risse, “When Europeanization Meets Diffusion”, op. cit., p. 201. 
125 European Commission, “Southern Gas Corridor: Vice-President Šefčovič attended 
Ministerial Meeting in Baku”, Press Release, 13 February 2015. 
126 Börzel & Risse, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion”, op. cit., p. 15. 
127 M. B. Seeberg, “State Capacity and the Paradox of Authoritarian Elections”, 
Democratization, vol. 21, no. 7, 2014, pp. 1265-1285. 
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elections. Yet, the EU’s democracy promotion focuses on free and fair elections as 
the fundamental establishment for a democratic transition. Conversely, elections in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan have had the exact opposite effect: due to high state 
capacity, elections induced further stability of the existing semi-authoritarian regime. 
The “analysis of formal institutions (presidency, elections, civil society, etc.) can 
distract our attention from the core realm of pseudopolitics”.128 Unlike in Western 
democracies, what matters in these societies are “ethnic, religious, regional, clan, 
community, family, personal, tribal, and other informal […] relations”.129  
People from the Karabakh region keep dominating political affairs in Armenia, partly 
because of uncertainty about the country’s stance in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, should the leadership become more representative of the whole 
population. In fact, regardless of the corrupt behaviour and business interests of the 
politicians, people seem content with the way they address the conflict. As long as 
Nagorno-Karabakh remains the primary concern for Armenians, the ruling clan is 
likely to stay as well. In Azerbaijan, providing oil wealth nurtures the patronage 
network around the Nakhichevan and Yeraz clans, there is no interest in 
implementing the rule of law or strengthening democratic institutions either (see 
Table 5). Paradoxically, key members of both leaderships originate from territories 
that lie geographically closer to the capital of their counterpart – a combination that 
seems to enforce mutual hostility rather than enabling conflict resolution. 
Civil society activism, in turn, is a relatively new phenomenon in all post-Soviet 
countries. In Azerbaijan civil society continues to be restricted and controlled by 
government funding, whereas in Armenia independent civil associations and NGOs 
have gradually emerged, but nevertheless remain disengaged in politics (see Table 
5). The EU’s assistance to civil society organisations, as much as it is welcomed by the 
people, “has often led to a short-lived mushrooming of NGOs” without 
accomplishing a long-term structural change which is arguably a great challenge in 
a culture where social apathy makes the people distance themselves from the elitist 
game of politics.130  
128 Guliyev, “Post-Soviet Azerbaijan”, op. cit., p. 401. 
129 Ibid., p. 403. 
130 T. A. Börzel, “The Transformative Power of Europe Reloaded: The Limits of External 
Europeanisation”, KFG Working Paper Series, no. 11, Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) The 
Transformative Power of Europe, Freie Universität Berlin, February 2010, p. 20. 
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The South Caucasus is sometimes referred to as the least likely case of 
Europeanisation, due to the costliness of the process, limited EU incentives and 
generally low resonance of EU norms.131 Indeed, the EU has not managed to bring 
about a change in Azerbaijan, but similar failure in Armenia is a misconception. 
During the three years of DCFTA negotiations, large-scale reforms were conducted 
according to the EU’s recommendations, partly owing to Armenia’s geopolitical 
situation. Namely, as the “direct route to Europe [is] shut off by the sealed Armenian-
Turkey border”, 70% of Armenia’s total imports and exports are carried through 
Georgian territory, the long detour of which has made the Armenian market 
unattractive for most businesses to invest in.132 As a country whose economic 
situation is dependent on stability in Georgia, Armenia was encouraged by the 2008 
Russo-Georgian war to diversify its trade relations, which ultimately resulted in an 
increased leverage for the EU. Not having publicly cheered their economic reform or 
pronounced a willingness to join the EU does not mean Armenians are not interested 
in the EU’s economic model. Due to security concerns and heavy reliance on Russian 
support, Armenia simply had to go through a process of ‘silent Europeanisation’. 
Even though Armenia is now constrained by its participation in the Eurasian 
Economic Union, the domestic desire to reform remains acute. 
The perception of the EU in the two countries has been damaged by the all-inclusive 
structure of the ENP not meeting the countries’ expectations. Azerbaijan saw its 
inclusion in the policy as a way to establish visa-free travel for its citizens and 
enhance the energy partnership, but remained uninterested in political reforms or 
deep economic integration with the EU.133 Armenia was hoping for a greater EU 
contribution to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but trying "to play a policy 
of equidistance between Armenia and Azerbaijan […] meant that the EU ended up 
having virtually no policy at all”.134 This balanced and indeed somewhat ambiguous 
approach worked until the annexation of Crimea in 2014 when the perceived 
legitimacy of the EU deteriorated significantly: Azerbaijani authorities are very 
disappointed that the EU is not supporting the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan as 
vocally as it does in the case of Ukraine. 
131 T. Börzel & Y. Pamuk, “Pathologies of Europeanization: Fighting Corruption in the Southern 
Caucasus”, Anti-Corruption Resesarch Network, 21 February 2011. 
132 Iskandaryan, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy”, op. cit., p. 10; A. C. Killough, “Armenia in Need of 
an Alternative Export-Import Route”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 5, no. 195, 10 October 2008. 
133 Popescu, “Keeping the Eastern Partnership on Track”, op. cit., p. 1. 
134 N. Popescu, “ENP and EaP: Relevant for the South Caucasus?”, in South Caucasus - 20 
Years of Independence, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011, p. 325; Babayan, op. cit., p. 3. 
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The recent ENP review attempts to close this gap between expectations and the EU 
offer. The most significant change for these two countries is the greater emphasis on 
the principle of differentiation.135 This means that each country will enjoy a more 
tailor-made approach of the EU, as opposed to the previous model where each of 
them was headed towards similar Association Agreements and visa liberalisation.136 
This is something that Azerbaijan has long wished for. The review is promising in terms 
of taking each country’s individual challenges into greater consideration, but in 
order to ensure the influence the EU is seeking, the implementation of this principle 
would need to be accompanied by a thorough understanding of the dynamics of 
how these five conditions affect the success of any external influence. 
It is difficult to assess whether all five conditions analysed above are of the same 
relative weight. Undoubtedly, they are interconnected. The region-based kinship, the 
lack of civic culture or the rarity of self-organisation on the societal level are reflected 
in the continuation of elitist pluralism, informal practices of nepotism, or the 
formulation of ‘catch-all’ political parties on the state level, and vice versa. The 
countries’ political regimes, in turn, constitute the space for domestic liberal 
coalitions to emerge, and these coalitions can only be empowered by the EU’s 
conditionality, if the EU norms are perceived as desirable and legitimate among the 
people. This legitimacy is always affected by the extent to which an EU norm is 
followed among its own member states, and, lastly, in case a competing 
governance provider already has a great influence in the country, the EU is left with 
a rather narrow niche in which to introduce its own democratisation agenda. 
Despite context-dependence, the same interconnectedness is true for any other ENP 
country as well, or for any third country for that matter. 
 
Evaluation of the Theories 
The authors of the theories have not always recognised these links between different 
conditions. Compared to norm diffusion and SFP, the external governance 
approach offers the most comprehensive set of conditions under which the 
externalisation of EU rules is likely to be more effective, from institutional setup and 
power-relations to domestic factors. However, external governance does not present 
135 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Joint Communication “Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy”, 
JOIN(2015) 50 final, Brussels, 18 November 2015. 
136 Ibid. 
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the three explanations and the nine factors that condition the mode and 
effectiveness of external governance as complementary to each other. Instead, 
they are presented as an ‘either-or’ case, omitting potential conjunctions between, 
for example, the extent to which an EU rule is complied with among member states is 
related to the third countries' perception of the EU. Unlike external governance, SFP 
acknowledges interlocking between the different sectors and levels of analysis. 
The factors are not equally relevant in all countries but vary in terms of significance 
and impact. In this study, Armenians’ willingness to reform and their admiration for 
the EU’s model of economic well-being became a key driving force behind the 
country’s economic modernisation, outweighing all other conditions. SFP sees these 
immaterial factors as crucial for a foreign policy to have sustainable effects, and 
norm diffusion mentions domestic incentives as ‘essential elements’. External 
governance does not discern any of the conditions as being crucial per se, although 
they too lean more towards the explanation based on domestic factors. As all 
theories are remarkably context-dependent, the results of their application will, in 
any case, vary across countries, regions and policy fields. If one were to test these 
conditions for the EU’s influence in Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, or any other 
country, their conclusions would certainly differ from the ones arrived at in this paper. 
By focusing on domestic structures, the theories – as well as this paper – risk 
underestimating the impact of mutual interdependence not only between a third 
country and the EU, but between the third countries themselves and in their relation 
to other regional powers. This became especially relevant in the case of Armenia, 
whose dependence on another competing structural power has greater impact on 
the country’s foreign policy choices than its political regime, state capacity or 
domestic liberal incentives do. Norm diffusion and the external governance 
approach acknowledge power asymmetries in the bilateral relationship between a 
norms exporter and a target, but applying this notion to a wider multilateral 
environment would complement both models. It would also reveal that, compared 
to Russia, Turkey or Iran, the EU has had far less of an impact on the two countries in 
the South Caucasus than it likes to believe. 
All three theories explain how the EU’s norms, rules, values or practices are adopted 
in other parts of the world. Therefore, it is inevitable that the EU is at the centre of their 
attention. As much as the theories emphasise the importance of domestic factors in 
partner countries, they still attribute democratic change to actions taken by the EU. 
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Even when indirect emulation posits an action starting from the ‘receiving’ end, the 
model still assumes the principal ‘source’ for change being the EU. Interestingly, only 
liberal reforms are ascribed to the EU’s positive conditionality model, but if 
developments on the ground take the opposite course, such as transition from a 
democracy-oriented rule towards authoritarianism in Azerbaijan, it is considered to 
be something unrelated to the EU’s actions. 
In an attempt to lessen this ambivalence, SFP is not confined to the occurrence of 
change – it might as well be aimed at sustaining the status quo in a target country. 
This is something completely different from the ideas of external governance, norm 
diffusion, transformative power or even Europeanisation theories. Institutional change 
is neither a necessary precondition nor a dependent variable for Keukeleire and 
Delreux, while neither external governance nor norm diffusion consider sustaining 
existing structures as an option. For them, anything less than a domestic change is 
not regarded as a result of the EU’s influence. Arguably, the impact of one actor on 
another in supporting existing structures is even more difficult to be determined than 
external influence in case of change is. 
Although a successful SFP takes into account the organising principles within as many 
sectors and levels as possible, it offers little explanation for how these then influence 
the internalisation of norms. Norm diffusion and external governance models explain 
that liberal reforms are more likely to be accepted in partly democratised countries 
than in authoritarian regimes. SFP would simply deduce that the foreign policy has to 
take into account that the third country is authoritarian/semi-authoritarian/ 
democratic, but the theory is missing an argumentation on how exactly these 
domestic structures then affect the sustainability of a policy’s effects. 
Altogether, it is important to keep in mind that in social sciences, no theory can offer 
an absolute truth, and external governance, norm diffusion and SFP are no 
exceptions. All three theories provide presumable contingencies and explanations 
on some identifiable tendencies, but after all, they were all constructed on the basis 
of different case studies themselves that do not necessarily correspond to the ones 
conducted in this paper. Moreover, as the practices of foreign policy change over 
time, so do the endeavours to conceptualise them. Nevertheless, it is argued that a 
combination of several theories that overlap in some areas, disagree in others, but 
most importantly, complement each other where they have weaknesses, provides a 
more reliable basis for case studies than any of them alone. 
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Conclusion: Domestic Limits to Europeanisation 
This paper sought to explain why the EU has had limited influence in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan when it comes to democracy promotion. It showed that the domestic 
political structures in the countries do not meet the core conditions for the EU to 
enjoy sufficient leverage to induce a democratic change. Elitist political regimes, 
social apathy towards politics, unjust elections, occasional authoritarian trends, 
constant security concerns and the dependence on Russia constrain Armenia’s 
Europeanisation effort more than the perception of EU rules and the desirability of 
internalising the economic model can facilitate it. The high state capacity of 
Azerbaijan should, in theory, facilitate the diffusion of EU norms. However, corruption, 
clan structures and informal practices in this oil-rich semi-authoritarian country make 
the political elite immune to international criticism on human rights violations and the 
state of democracy. In both cases, factors obstructing EU influence have greater 
reverberation than the ones encouraging a change. 
The reason why the EU has “neither managed to be a decisive force for good, nor to 
prevent negative regional trends” in the South Caucasus, is its little appreciation of 
the factors that shape the governments’ policies and contribute to the continuity of 
the current regime.137 A lot of the challenges identified in the case studies stem from 
the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, suggesting that any external actor is more 
likely to bring about a domestic democratic change when putting greater emphasis 
on conflict resolution than on political conditionality. Yet, the EU’s democracy 
promotion agenda of supporting civil society, political opposition and elections has 
been inspired by the Western experience of democratic transition. 
This overlooks informal organising principles, societal structures, security concerns and 
economic situations that dictate political affairs. Although the structural political 
problems are essentially different, with elitist pluralism in Armenia and nepotism in 
Azerbaijan, informal clan structures prevail over formal democratic institutions in both 
of them. On that note, the hypothesis of this paper is confirmed: the EaP has not 
been able to induce a democratic change in Armenia and Azerbaijan, because the 
EU’s policy does not take into account the countries’ domestic political structures. 
Understanding and accepting these domestic limits to Europeanisation can be the 
basis for either adjusting expectations to the reality or negotiating a more ambitious 
agreement in future.  
137 Popescu, “ENP and EaP”, op. cit., p. 316. 
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